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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY, a

~Iunicipal

Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
CLYDE C.

P~\TTERSON,

Defendant and Respondent.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant sought by way of declaratory judgmen1
in the lower court (1) that court's determination that
under Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, now commonly
referred to as Section 104-4-2, Utah Code· Annotated,
1943, as amended, Ogden City qualifies for but one city
judge, and (2) that if it be determined that under such
section Ogden qualifies for two city judges, still the
respondent Patterson is not lawfully a city judge of
Ogden City.
The chronology of events leading up to the present
litigation are as follows:
On ~larch 8, 19·51, the Legislature enacted what is
now known as Chapter 26, La.ws of Utah, 1951, and
which we hereinafter refer to· as Sections 104-4-2, 1044-3, 104-4-3.10, 104-4-3.11, and 104-4-3.12, U.C.A. 1943,
as amended. These enactments became effective May
8, 1951. So far as here pertinent they read as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"104--4-2. Judges-Election of-Number of
Judges-Term and Tenure of Office.
At the municipal election to be held in the
year 1951 and sexennially thereafter, city judges
shall be elected by the qualified electors of their
respective cities in the manner provided by this
act. In cities having a population, as determined
by the next official census and each official census thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100,000
there shall be two city judges ; * * *. ''
'j

'' 104-4-3. Id. Appointment by Mayor Pending Election.
Whene·ver it shall appear hy official census
that any city has attained sufficient population
to place it within the class of cities having city
courts, or to raise it to a class entitled to have
an additional judge or judges, the mayor of such
city, with the consent of the governing body
thereof, shall appoint a city judge or judges who
shall be entitled to serve until twelve o'clock
noon on the first Monday of January succeeding
the next municipal election after said appointment or appointments a.re made, at which city
judges are elected, and until their successors are
ele-cted and qualified.''
'' 104-4-3.10.
• * *
(a) *
(h)

~

Declaration of Candidacy.

* *.
* *.

(c) * * *. If only one candidate files for any
specific office, such person shall forthWith be
issued a certificate of election by the city recorder. * * *. ''
2
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On July 31, 1951, and within the time allowed by law
therefor, Patterson filed his declaration of candidacy,
supported by the required petition of one hundred voters, for the office of Judge of the Second Division of
the Ogden City Court (the office held by the then incumbent city judge being designated by the City Recorder as Judge of the First Division). No other candidates filing for Judge of the Second Division within
the time allowed by la,v, the City Recorder, on August
7, 1952, issued to ~Ir. Patterson a certificate of election
to this office as provided by Section 104-4-3.10, supra,
and duly advised the governing body of Ogden City that
she had done so. (E,xhibit 1).
On November 6, 1951, Ogden City held its regular
municipal election, and it did not submit to the voters
the office of Judge of the Second Division of the Ci~y
Court.
On December 4, 1951, as an ''economy measure''
the ·Ogden City Counsel decide·d to refuse to create the
job if that was legally possible.
On December 27, 1951, the emoluments of the office
of Judge of the Second Division were included by Ogden
City in its budget, and the City Manager was "authorized" to take whatever steps were necessary to determine ''the legality of this case'' by declaratory action.
(Exhibit A).
On December 31, 1951, Ogden City adopted its budget, which included the salary for the second judge. On
the same day its City Recorder received for filing and
filed Patterson's oaJth a.s judge of such second division.
3
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On January 5, 1952, Mr. Thatcher, as attorney for
Ogden City, filed a complaint herein, by which not
only the question of the existence of the office was raised,
but the second question-purely gratuitous as we view
it-of Patterson's right to hold the office, assuming it
does exist. Respondent will develop its views under
four points of argument, as follows:
POINT I:
THE OFFICE FOR WHICH P ATTERSQN
HOLDS A CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION AND
FOR WHICH HE QUALIFIED BY TAKING THE
REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE· DOES EXIST.
(A) BECAUSE IT WAS CREATED BY THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 104-4-2, and
(B) REGARDLE1SS OF THE INTERPRETATION TO BE GIVEN SECTION 104-4-2 THE
OFFICE HERE IN QUESTION CAME INTO
BEING BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3.
POINT II:
APPELLANT OGDEN CITY IS WITHOUT
RIGHT TO RAISE~ THE QUESTION OF RES:PONDENT'S RIGHT TO HOLD THE OFFICE
BECAUSE
(A) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO THE OFFICE
CAN BE RAISED ONLY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE
STATE, OR BY ANOTHER CLAIMANT TO
THE OFFICE; and
(B) OGDEN CITY CANNOT ATTACK THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW
WHICH VESTED RESPONDENT WITH
THE OFFICE.
4
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PO I~:rr III :
SECT!()~

IS NOT UNCONSTITUTION _A_L IN ITS PROVISIONS FOR THE ISSU_._-\.NCE OF _._\ CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION TO
AN l-.-KCOXTESTED CANDIDATE.
104-4:-3.10

POINT IV:
GENERAL OBSERVATION ON THE PUBLIC
INTEREST.
THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OFFICE FOR WHICH PATTERSON HOLDS
A CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION AND FOR WHICH
HE QUALIFIED BY TAKING THE REQUIRED
OATH OF OFFICE DOES EXIST (A) BECAUSE
IT WAS CREATED BY THE PROVISION OF SECTION 104-4-2, AND (B) REGARDLESS OF THE INTERPRETATION TO BE GIVEN SE·CTION 104-4-2
THE OFFICE HERE IN QUESTION CAME· INTO
BEING BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3.
(A) THE OF~,ICE WAS CREATED BY VIRTUE OF
SECTION 104-4-2.
Appellant Ogden City's position with respect to
this phase of the matter is summed up concisely by the
allegation of its complaint (Par. 13) (a) that the office
in question will not come into heing
''Until it shall be determined by the official census next hereafter ensuing''
5
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that Ogden has a population of fifty thousand. On the
contrary, respondent's position is that the office was
in existence on July 31, 1951, when he filed his declaration of candidacy therefor, and has been ever since.
This point of argument does not concern itself with
the question of whom, if anyone, holds the office, but
with the sole question of whether the office exists. The
answer lies with the interpretation to he given to Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 19·51, enacted March 8, 1951,
effective May 8, 1951, and particularly the t.wo sections
thereof known as 104-4-2 and 104-4-3, supra. Both of
these sections of the statute are self-executing. As and
when the conditions required by either exist the office
as such comes into being without anything further required. We accordingly examine the provisions thereof
in the light of the known £acts to the end of dete-rmining
if either have become operative insofar as Ogden City
is concerned.
'The pertinent language, insofar as Section 104-4-2
is ~orrcerned, is :
''In cities having a population, as d·ete-rmined
by the next official census and each official census thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100,000,
there shall be two city judges.''

Ogden City contends that the key words "next
official census'' mean the number of people listed on
the census enumeration sheets officially taken next
after the effective date of the act. Respondent contends that it means the official announcement of the
. 6
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correct enumeration, \Yhic.h announcement occurs next
after the effectiYe date of the act, and as the official
announcement of the 1950 count 'Yas not made until
subsequent to the effectiYe date of the act, that announcement here controls.
What is a census·? Is it the actual count, as claimed
by appellant~? Or is it the official announcement as
to the results of that count after duplications, omissions,
mistakes and other errors have been eliminated~
.J._~uthorities

probably are not in complete agreement upon the subject, but a careful reading and analysis
of each case actually results in fairly complete reconcilement. A general legal definition of the meaning of the
word "census" is found in 14 C .J.S. (Census) Section 1,
Page 101:
''In general, a census must he an official
enumeration of the people, and, as such, a public
record, containing not merely a sum total, hut
an official list, of the names of all the inhabitants
preserved in the public archives. . . '' .
And in 14 C.J.S (Census) Section 6, Page 103:
"In the absence of a statute requiring any
formal action by the census board or the legislature, a census goes into legal effect, as such,
on its compilation and publication by the census
superintendent or hoard. It is generally held
that a census, after it has been officially determined or ascertained and published does not relate back and give the fact force as of the date
of which the census was to be taken; but it has
also been held that a census, being the enumeration of the population and not the announcement
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of the result, becomes effective as of the date
taken. An authorized announcement of a federal
census 1s official, even though not final, and expressly subject to correc~tion. ''
Cases supporting this general statement of the law
include the following:

Lewis v. Lackawanna County (Pa) 50 A.. 162
(1901)
The second syllabus reads:
''Under a.ct March 31, 1876, providing for
salaries of county officers in counties with more
than 150,000 inhabitants, county offiees do not
become salaried offices immediately on the county
attaining sueh population, but only when such
fact is legally ascertained by the census bureau
making returns of the population to congress, or
making final report; and such aseertainment does
not relate back, and give the fact force as of the
date of which the census was to be taken.''
(Italics added)
And from the opinion:
''It is of general knowledge that the results
of the census have not been promptly reached;
that of 1880 not having been officially announced
until 1883, and that of 1890 not until 1895. On
the argument of appellee everything dependent
on the census would be kept in a state of suspension, or in danger of being turned topsy-turvy,
for an indefinite period. The only escape from
such intolerable inconven.ience and confusion is
by adherence to the. logical principles of the law
that. the fact becomes applicable only from its
legal ascertainment." (Italics added).
8
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lrolfe v. ( ify of Jloorhead (Jli'ull.) 107 N. W.
728 (1906)
1

The third syllabus reads:

··OENSUS-TIL\iE OF TAKING EFFECT:
The fifth decennial census of Minnesota went
into legal effect upon its compilation and publication by the superintendent of the census, and
not upon the deposit of the enumeration in his
hands.''
. .c\_nd from the opinion :
··The plaintiff argues that, inasmuch as the
enumeration was required to be completed on or
before the 1st day of July, and to be pla.ced in
the hands of the superintendent of the census not
later than the lOth of July, therefore the election
held in October was governed by statutes applicable to cities of more than 4,000 inhabitants.
That enumeration did not constitute the census
in law; on the contrary, it was but a step in its
creation. The census went into legal effect upon
its compilation and publication by the superintendent. Section 18. Until that time, the various
municipal corporations of the state \Vere governed
by the laws applicable to cities of the class determined by the previous census. ''
Broyles v. Mahaska County (Ia.) 239 N. W.
1 (1931)

In this case, as in the preceding one, the statute
directed publication of the figures, which is what the
federa.l law requires.
The first syllabus reads:
9
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'' Sinc.e publication of census is to be under
se-cretary of state's certificate,, date of certificate
determines when census becomes effective.''
The second syllabus reads:
''Where secretary of state did not certify
1925 census of Iowa until February 1, 1926, census did not become effective until such date.''
And from the opinion :
''It is apparent from these provisions of the
Code that it was the intent of the Legislature to
fix a time when said census report should become
effective. Such things are matters whic.h courts
eannot determine, as they vary from time to time
with the change in population, and it was the
evident inte-nt of the Legislature, as shown by
the requirements in these sections, that the publication of this c.ensus was to he under the certificate of the sec.retary of state, which must be
dated, and it must therefore follow that the date
of the eertifica.te is the day on which the census
becomes effective.
''As applied to this case, the evidence shows
this c.ertifica.te was dated February 1, 1926. It
must be held, therefore, that the new 1925 census
was not effective until the last-named date-, and
prior to tha.t the city of Oskaloosa had, in law,
a population of less than 10,000. This is in line
with the holdings in other states. As throwing
light on this question, see State v. Smith, 149
Wash. 173, 270 P. 306; Holcomb v. Spikes (Tex.
Civ. App.) 282 S. W. 891; Wolfe v. City of Moorehead, 98 Minn. 113, 197 N. W. 72'8; State v.
Brooks, 58 Wash. 648, 109 P. 211. ''
Also we refer to the following:

10
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Holcomb v. 8pike (llex.) 232 f3. W. 891:

•'A census must he an official enumeration
of the people, and as such a public record containing not merely a sum total, but an official
list of the names of all inhabitants . . "

State v. Wooten ( JJ o.) 122 S. W. 1101 :
'• A census of a city is an official enumeration of the inhabitants with details of sex, age
and family. It is a public document to be preserved jn the archives of the city, rather than
a mere sum total of the inhabitants.''

City of Hungington v. Cast (Ind.) 48 N. W.
10±5:
''A c.ensus is not merely a sum total, but an
official list containing the names of all the inhabitants.''
The above three cases and the excerpts therefrom
are cited and quoted by appellant as support for its
position that it is the actual count that is important,
but the language imports the contrary. They say that
the census is the ''official list'' which o hviously is not
the tally of the enumerators, but rather a document prepared therefrom and reflecting the correction of all
errors and mistakes made by the enumerators.
Applying this to our own situation. There is a
discrepancy of 204 between the first preliminary announcement of 56,908 (R. 030-031) and the final listing
of 57,112 (R. 014, Exhibit B). Obviously, the official
census is the final c.orrected list of 57,112 as announced
by the Director on June 17, 1951, and not the actual
count made by the enumerators during April, 1950, which

11
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patently was erroneous, or the equally erroneous preliminary announcement of 56,908 made on June 14, 1950,
or of 56,910 made on August 25, 1950.
Further reference should perhaps he here made to
the case of Lewis v. Lackawanna, supra., and quoted
from by appellant at. page 11 of its brief as follows:
"The census is the enumeration of the population, not the announcement of the results.''
We have carefully examined this case as it appears
in 50 Atlantic 162, and find no such statement as that
therein. On the contrary the case holds that it is the
final report of the census bureau which controls, and
which report does not relate back to the date of actual
taking.
We do come, however, to a group of cases holding
that preliminary announcements have their place in
the overall scheme, and may be used as "guideposts"
for official action. Cases of this type are

State v. Ryan (Mo.) 133 S. W. 8 (1910)
Ervine v. Sta.te (Tex.) 44 S. W. (2) 380 (19·31)
Herdon v. Garfield County (Okla.) 295 P. 223 (1931)
Childers v. Dew,all, 62 S. W. 802 (Ark.)
Elliot v. Sta,te (Okla.) 1 P. 2d 370 (1931)
Gross v. Ross (Ky.) 185 8. W. 2d 547 (1945)
Washita County v. Lowden (Okla.) 116 P. 2d 700
(1941)
Forde v. Owens (S. C.) 158 S. E. 157 (1931)
. 12
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r_rhese case~ are all to the effect that the preliminary
report may be used as a guide in determining a status.
In other words, the preliminary report may be relied
upon until the final report is made.
Examples of

thi~

type of case are :

E-rl'iu r. State (Tex) 1931. Page 1 of the syllabus
states:
''Preliminary a1mouncement of census showing· eity over 20,000 should have been guide of
officials concerning mode of drawing jury (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 2094; 13 U.S.C.A. Sectios ±, 205, 213, and 210 et seq.)."

Washita County v. Lowden (Okla.) 1941.

''1. CENSUS
In determining classification into which
county should be placed for county officers'
salary purpose, a census bulletin officially
issued~ though a preliminary report, was a guide
for official action with respect to population."
These cases are of little actual value in the determination of what is a census, because that question
was not there involved. The inference to be gathered
therefrom, however, is that if the preliminary announcements are but guideposts, they are guideposts to the
census, whic.h of necessity must be the final official
announcement.
There are a group of cases, however, which may
appear at first blush to support appellant's position
that the effective date of the census was the date as of
which it was taken, rather than the subsequent official
announcement. These cases are

13
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Underwood v. Hickman (Tenn) 39 S. W. 2d 1034
Twin Falls v. Koehler (Ida) 123 P. 2d 715
Jordan v. DeHart (Wash.) 131 P. 2d 156.
However, in each of these cases the question involved
was the time of the fact itself, rather than the time of
determination of the fact. In other words, if the words
''as determined'' were eliminated from the phrase ''as
determined by the next official census'' appearing in
our statute, the cases would be more in point. In the
recent case of Varble v. Whitecotton (Mo) 190 S. W. 2d
244 (1945) the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed and
distinguished these three cases. This Missouri court
said:
'' ( 3, 4) There is no statutory provision, either
Federal or State, which sets the time when the
results of a census shall become official. In such
a situation the general rule is that a census becomes official as of the date of its official publication. 14 C.J.S., Census, Section 6. This court
has always taken judicial notice of ''the official
records of the eensus'' and we find no case where
the fact of population has been proved by other
means. State ex rel. Harris v. Herrman, 75 Mo.
340; State ex rei. Martin v. Wofford, 131 Mo. 61,
25 S. W~ 851; State ex inf. Crow v. Evans, 166
Mo. 347, 66 S. W. 355. In State ex rei, Major v.
Ryan, 232 Mo. 77, 133 S. W. 8, a quo warranto to
remove the jury commissioners of St. Joseph because the population fell below the applicable
limit, the natio.nal census of 1910 'as officially
promulgated'' was the basis of the decision. And
in Jerabek v. City of St. Joseph, 159 Mo. App.
505, 141 S. W. 456, which considered a motion to
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quash a panel selected by the abovP jury coinmissioners, the court of appeals in sustaining the
motion pointed out the jury had been selected
after "·the federal census of 1910 was officially
announced.'' To the same effect was Childers v.
Duvall, 69 . A.rk. 336, 63 S. W. 802; Holcomb v.
Spikes, Tex. <._'1iv. App. 232 S. W. 891; Lewis v.
Laeka"~anna County, 17 Pa. Super. 25; Id., 200
Pa. 590. 50 A. 162. There are contrary rulings
mainly in cases "rhere the fact of population
rather than its determination by the census controls. 8ee Underwood v. Hickman, 162 Tenn. 689,
39 S. \v.... 2d 1034 ~ State ex rei. Jordan v. Hart,
15 \\'"ash. 2d 551, 131 P. 2d 156; City of Twin
Falls ex rel. Cannon v. Koehler, 63 Idaho 562,
123 P. 2d ·715; Forde v. Owens, 160 S. C. 168,
158 S. E. 147.
·' ( 3) The application of the statute we are
considering is governed by the official records of
the census. The statute itself denotes this. According to its terms the mere fact of the population in and of itself does not determine the
statute's relevancy. The determining factor is
something more. It is the population as enumerated ''according to the last preceding national
census.'' Thus the operation of the statute is
based on the record of the census. The record of
the census furnishes the evidence under which
the statute shall be operative. Dunne v. l(ansas
City Cable R. Co., 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641. This
appears to us to be an added reason why the
application of the statute to Jackson County
could not change at least until the official record
of the ''last preceding census'' was promulgated
disclosing Jackson County had a population
which was without the limits set by the statute.''
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We cannot close our discussion of the authorities
dealing with the question of what is the effective date
of a census without comment upon the case of State
ex rel Brunjes v. Brockleman (M o) 240 8. W. 209, which
appellant holds up to this court as being ''the only case
directly in point". (Page 17 of appellant's brief).
In that case the statute, effective as of January 1,
1921, spoke of the ''next decennial census of the United
States", and the court held that it could not refer to
the 1920 census, which was then complete, but must of
necessity refer to a subsequent one. This begs the
question so far as "'re are concerned, because in our case
the census was not completed until the enumeration was
corrected, which was subsequent to the effective date
of our act.
Further than that, we have the· case of Varble v.
Whitecotton, sup·~a, decided by this. same Mlisspuri
eourt some twenty-three years later, specifically holding
that it is the official record of the census which governs
the application of the statute.
We submit, aecordingly, that under the law the
legislature, in speaking of the ''next official census'',
spoke of the official announcement yet to be made of
the results of the 1950 count. Otherwise we have a situation where it must be said that the Legislature in 1951
was legislating for the future without regard to the
present. An hypothesis will demonstrate the fallacy of
eonstruing the word census to mean the count made as
of April 1, rathe.r than the subsequent official report of
the results of such count. Assume that through an error
in assignments duplicate enumerators were sent into
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one ~eetiou of the eity, and as a consequence their tally
sheets listed 55,000, and the preliminary announcement
so sho"~ed. Subsequent review by the census bureau
disclosed the error, and the final official report showed
45,000. What "yas the official census 1 Was it the false
and faulty count of the enumerators 1 Or was it the
accurate list &s reported officially by the Director~
Obviously it is the latter.
In ~Iarch, 1951 the 1950 count had been made, some
preliminary announcements had been given out which
were faulty and incomplete, but the legislature was not
advised as to \Yhat the official reports might show.
Accordingly, "-hen the legislature spoke of the ''next
official census,' it must have referred to the official
reports of the 1950 count yet to be announced.
The official announc~ment of June 17, 1951, aecordingly, rendered Section 104-4-2 operative, and there
was, accordingly, thereafter the offices of two judges
of the Ogden Court to be filled in the manner provided
by Section 104-4-3.10.
(B) REGARDLESS OF THE INTERPRETATION
TO BE GIVEN SECTION 104-4-2 THE OFFICE
HERE IN QUESTION CAME INTO BEING BY
VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3.
Section 104-4-3 provides as follows:
"Whenever it shall appear by official census
that any city has attained sufficient population
to place it within the class of cities having city
courts, or to raise it to a class entitled to have
an additional judge or judges, the mayor of
such city, with the consent of the governing body
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thereof, shall appoint a city judge or judges who
shall be entitled to serve until twelve o'clock
noon on the first Monday of January succeeding
the next municipal election after said appointment or appointments are- made, at which city
judges are elected, and until their successors are
elected and qualified.''
It is to be noted that here we have an entirely different condition than in the preceding section, which
spoke of ''as determined by the next official census''.
Here the condition is ''whenever it shall appear by
official census''. Not the next census, and not the last
census, but amy official census. It is not denied, nor can
it be, that as of June 25, 1951, the date of final publication of the 1950 count, an official census showed
Ogden with a population in excess of 50,000. Thus, even
though it be held that the provisions of the preceding
se-ction are not operative, the provisions of the second
are, and the office exists, and has existed since at least
June 17, 1951.
Appellant suggests as its answer to the plain and
unequivocal language of Section 104-4-3 that this Section does not become operative until after 104-4-2 becomes operative, 'vhich may not be until 1960. In other
words, that the Legislature not only enacted 104-4-2 to
become operative some nine years hence, but went to
still further extremes and enacted 104-4-3 to become
operative at some still later date. This to us is pure
sophistry, and akin to the reflection cast upon our lawmaking body by the assertion (page 27 of appellant's
brief) that:
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·'in the light of leg·islati ve hi~ tory it is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature may sometimes be unreasonable.''
It is one thing to torture 104-4-2 into a construction
that the Leg·islature in 1951 'Yas legislating for the
future, and not for the present. To go to the still
greater extreme and argue that this same Legislature
in enacting 104-4-3, and in using the phrase ''an official
census'', not only did not haYe in mind a present census,
or the official announcement of the 1950 census, but had
in mind an official census after the next official census
("'"hich, in the normal ~vents, means 1970, for
history sho"'"S that the federal decennial census is the
only one that is ever taken) requires, in our judgment,
just some such concept of legislative endeavors as is
evidenced by the foregoing observation of legislative
unreasonableness.
We submit, accordingly, that from and after June
25, 1951, the office here in question existed,
(a) Because that is the date of the ''next official
census'' referred to in Section 104-4-2, and which rendered Section 104-4-2 operative; and,
(b) Regardless of when the so-called 1950 census
became effective, certainly from and after June 25, 1951,
an "official census" showed Ogden with a population
in excess of 50,000. This is all that was required to
make Section 104-4-3 operative, and bring the office
into existence.
Appellant's contention that the office did not exist
either at the time of trial or theretofore, and does not'
now exist, cannot be sustained.
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POINT II.
APPELLANT OGDEN CITY IS WITHOUT
RIGHT TO RAISE rrHE QUESTION OF RESPONDE;NT'S RIGHT TO HOLD THE OFFICE
BECAUSE (A) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO
THE OFFICE CAN BE RAISED ONLY BY THE
ATTORNE.Y GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE
STATE, OR BY ANOTHER CLAI11ANT TO THE
OFFICE; AND (B) OGDEN CITY CANNOT ATTACK THE CONSTITUTIONAI_jiTY OF THE
LAW WHICH VESTED RESPONDENT WITH
THE OFFICE.
Appellant's second point of argument is that even
if the office does exist the respondent has no right
thereto. Respondent's answer is two-fold; first, that
this is a question which cannot be raised by appellant;
and second, it is without merit. The second answer will
be c.onsidered under point III of this brief.
(A) RESPONDE;NT'S RIGHT TO THE OFFICE
CAN· BE RAISED ONLY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE
STATE., OR BY ANOTHER CLAIMANT TO
THE OFFICE.
Appellant here seeks by Declaratory Judgment to
have determined a question which is quo warranto in
character. While the extraordinary writ of quo warranto as such has been abolished by Rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, nevertheless the courts are
given the power to grant appropriate relief where a
question as to the right to hold public office arises. A
20
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cn~ual

reading of the rule diseloses, however, that suc.p
remedy is not open to appellant. Rule 65B (h), (c)
and (d), so far as pertinent, provides:
4
'

(b) Grounds for Relief.
may be granted:

Appropriate relief

(1) Where any person usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, * • •.; ~
''(c) Action by Attorney General Under Subdivision (b) ( 1) of this Rule.
The Attorney General may and when
directed so to do by the Governor shall
commence any action authorized by the
provisions of subdivision (h) ( 1) of this
rule. Such action shall he brought in the
name of the State of Utah.''
·~(d)

Action by Private Person Under Subdivision (b) ( 1) of this Rule.
A person desiring to he entitled to a
public or private office unlawfully held
and exercised by another may bring an
action therefor. * * *. ''

Thus, it is apparent that under this rule only the
attorney general, in the name of the state, or an individual himself claiming the office, can challenge respondent's right to the office. Ogden City does not
so qualify and neither the attorney general, nor any
individual, has sought to invoke the remedy. As a matter
of fact, and indicative of the position of the attorney
general's office. is the fact that he appeared in this
action and in the name of the State of Utah moved to
dismiss appellant's complaint.
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However, it may be suggested that the remedy under
Rule 65B is but an alternative remedy, and respondent's right to hold the office may nevertheless be
ehallenged by the City in a complaint for declaratory
judgment, despite the fact that no one else lays claim
thereto. The answer to that is that neither the language nor the purpose of the act lends itself to such
construction. If the office exists, and we are here assuming that it does, it should be filled. To the end of
filling it Ogden City has issued its certificate of election
to respondent, and has accepted and filed his oath of
office. No dispute exists as between Ogden City and
respondent as to who is entitled to hold the office, if
it exists. The· certificate of election issued by Ogden
City evidences complete agreement het,veen the parties
to this action as to who holds the office. If more than
one person was claiming the office, and Ogden City
thus found itself in the middle of the controversy, or
if, as in the case of Lockler v. West Palm Beach (Fla)
51 So. 2d 291, the city had a vacancy to fill by appointment, and was uncertain as to which of two men the
law contemplated should receive the appointment, we
could conceive of relief by way of declaratory judgment
being proper. But when, as here, there is but one
claimant to the office, and he is admittedly qualified,
has acquired the office in the manner provided by .law,
and taken the required oath, absent a claim by someone
else thereto there is no controversy to be determined
by way of declaratory judgment, or at all. And that a
justiciable controversy is essential to the entertaining
of an action for declaratory relief is well settled.
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(B) t)GDJ£X

t~lrl 1 Y
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--:-\.rrrrACK

THE

t~o~srriTUTIONALITY

OF ~rHE LAW
\·rHICH \:rESTED RESPONDENT WITH
THE OFFIL~E.
The seeond reason ,,·hy Ogden City cannot here
raise the question of respondent's right to this office
(still assuming that it does exist) is because it does so
solely upon the ground that Seetion 104-4-3.10 is unconstitutional in its provisions for the issuance of a
certificate of election to an uncontested candidate for
the office.
We say that Ogden City cannot so ehallenge the unconstitutionality of that law for the reason that this
court has held and reiterated that the constitutionality
of a statute cannot be raised by one whose rights are
not directly affected thereby.
ll.Am. Jur. 748:

''One of the elementary doctrines of constitutional la''T' firmly established by the authorities, is that the constitutionality of a legislative
act is open to attack only by a person whose rights
are affected thereby. Before a law can be assailed by any person on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, he must show that he has an
interest in the question in that the enforcement
of the law would be an infringement on his rights.
Assailants must therefore show the applicability
of the statute and that they are thereby injuriously affected. The burden of proof is upon
those who claim themselves harmed by a statute
to show how, as to them, the statute is unconstitutional. Thus, one who invokes the power
of the court to declare an act of Congress to be
23
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unconstitutional must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining,
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.''

State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 98 P. 2d 414.
State ex rel, Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49
P. 2d 408.
Utah Mfgrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P.
2d 229.
The statute provides (Section 104-4-3.10) in effect
that if but one candidate files for the office of city
judge he should forthwith he issued a certificate of
election for the ensuing term. With regard thereto appellant says :
"It is submitted that the proVIsion of the
law referred to is void and unconstitutional because it is contrary to the provisions of Article
IV, Section 2 and 8 by which it is provided that
every qualified citizen shall be entitled to vote
by secret ballot at every election.''
In other words, the statute is unconstitutional because it deprives the citizens of their right to vote. But
how, we ask, does this adversely affect the municipal
corporation of Ogden City~ If this proviso deprives
the citizens of Ogden City of a constitutional right to
vote, they, or any one of them, might in appropriate
proceedings challenge its validity. But Ogden City has
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no right of ballot, and having uo ~ueh right it is depriYed of nothing, and hence is in no wise adversely
affected.
\V. e restate the proposition in still another way. As

noted above, it is fundamental that for one to raise a
constitutional question he must show that the alleged
unconstitutional feature of the statute so operates as
to deprive him of a constitutional right. Likewise, it is
a prerequisite that he establish in himself the claimed
right which ·is alleged to be infringed.
16 C.J.S. (Constitutional La.w) Page 162.

Thus, as a condition to raising the constitutional
question that the statute deprives the voters of a right
to vote for the office, Ogden City must establish that
it has a right to vote, and that right is infringed.
So analyzed it is apparent Ogden City cannot as a
matter of law challenge the constitutionality of the law
upon the ground it does.
At least one other reason suggests itself in furthe-r
support of respondent's position in this regard. However, as the foregoing is conclusive of the matter we
mention it but briefly.
One who has accepted the benfits of a statute may
not thereafter question its constitutionality. Here
Ogden City h~s accepted and acted upon all of the
provisions of this statute. When no other candidate
filed for the office it issued its certificate of election.
When election time came it relied upon the statute and
saved itself the added costs and expenses incident to
placing respondent's name upon the ballot. Thence,
~5
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while the constitutionality is open to challenge by an
elector, it is not open to challenge by Ogden City whoS€
own conduct in not putting respondent's name on the
ballot gives rise to the only constitutional question involved.
POINT III
SECTION 104-4-3.10 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IN ITS PROVISIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION TO AN UNCONTESTED CANDIDATE.
Appellant's argument in substance on this phase
of the matter is that a city judge is ex-officio a precinct
justice of the peace, and being such he is a constitutional
officer and must be elected by reason of Section 1 and
8, of Article VIII, Constitution of Utah.
For the sake of the argument let it be assumed for
the moment that the office of precinct justice of the
pe.ac.e is a c.onstitutional office and cannot be abolished
by legislative enactments. It does not follow, however,
that the judge of a city court, which is not a constitutional
office, becomes a constitutional officer by reason of
being vested ex-officio with the duties of a constitutional
office.
To the end of rationalizing this matter in the light
of past decisions of this court, which are referred to
willy-nilly by appellant, without regard to changing
statutes, we revie'v the histo·ry of city court legislation and pertinent decisions by this court with respect
thereto.
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RPYised ~tatute~ of Utah, 1898,
the leg-islati,~e office of city justice of the peace was
created. That this \Ya s purely a legislative office wa.s
held by this court in the case of State ex rel v. H ow~ell,
26 c;tah 53, 72 P. 187, in the following language:

By

~ection ~13,

''The office of city justice of the peace is
not among the offices created by the Constitution, and, as it is purely statutory, the Legislature, in its discretion, under the authority conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, may before the expiration of the term of
the incumbent, alter or abridge the term, or
abolish the office entirely; or, when deemed necessary to the public interest, may abolish said
office in particular localities of the State, and
establish other and different courts therein.''
At this point it is interesting to note that this office
of city justice of the pea~e, which could be created, altered or abolished by the legislature at will, had concurrent jurisdiction with the office of precinct justice
of the peace. (Section 239, Rev. St. of Utah, 1898).
By Section 1, Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1901,
Municipal courts were created by the Legislature and
by Section 6 and 7 of such chapter given all or the civil
jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and criminal jurisdiction equal to that of city and county justices of
the peace.
At about the same time as the case of State ex rel
v. Howell, supra, which held that city courts, whether
they be city justices' courts or municipal courts, are
purely legislative, this court decided the case of Love
v. Liddle, 26 Utah 62, 72 P. 185, holding therein that
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legislation affecting the jurisdiction of c.onstitutional
justic.es' courts must apply to all such courts alike, and
could not be limited to but some. As that case concerned what .,vas strictly a justices' court under the
constitution. it is of little value for present purpose~s.
The next change of any significance came about in
1919 (Chapter 34, Laws of 1919) when Section 1701,
Com. Laws of Utah, 1917, was amended, and by virtue
thereof

Secti,on 1701
''the city courts, municipal courts, the offices
of city justiees of the peaee, and justices' courts
in all cities where city courts are hereby created
shall be united and shall c.onstitute the city courts
of such cities, the judges of which shall be ex·
officio justiees of the peace in such cities * * *. ''

Section 1712
"In cities where city courts are hereby
created no justiee of the peace shall be elected or
appointed, and the judge of the said city court
shall be ex-officio c.ity justice of the peace and
preeinct justice of the peace and as such shall
perform the duties of the said offices. Said city
judge, as ex-officio justice of the peace as provided in this title is here by made the successor
of the justices of the pea.c.e now qualified or acting in the city or precinct wheTe city courts are
created.''
In the case of Leatham v. Reger, 54 Utah 491, 182
P. 187, this court held the effect thereof was not to
abolish the constitutional justices' court, but rather to
continue it with but a single individual, name~ly, a so. called judge, discharging the duties of both the city
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court and ju~tice~' eourt. In other words, the two
courts, 'vhile administered by a single judg·e, remained
distinct.
That rity courts as surh under such statute were
separate and distinct from justices' courts is further
evidenced by this court's decision in the case of Rich
v. Tndustrz.aJ Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P. 2d 641, in
which this court pointed up the distinction by observing
that con~tables were required to serve processes out of
justices' eourts, but not out of city courts:
''Before that amendment, as well as since,
he was required to serve process issuing out of
the courts of the justices of peace. Since that
amendment, but not before, he is clothed with
authority but not required to serve process out
of the city court. ''
Thus the law continued - two separate and distinct
offices administered by a single individual - until the
1933 revision, at which time what had formerly been
Seeton 1701 became Section 20-4-2, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, and Section 1712 became Section 20-4-4.
Section 20-4-2 provided as follows :
''At the general election to he held in the
year 1932, and quadrennially thereafter,
there shall be elected by the qualified electors of their respective cities in the manner provided by the general ele-ction laws, in cities having a population of 50,000 or more, four judges,
and in other cities having a city court, one· judge,
to be known as judges of the city court, for a term
of four years beginning at 12 o'clock noon on
the first Monday of January succeeding their
election. ' '
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Thus it is to be seen that former Section 1701 was drastically amended, and among other things the provisions
of old Section 1701 for the ''uniting'' of the justices'
courts with the city courts were deleted. The effect
thereof was to do away completely with the justices'
courts in cities where city courts were established, and
continue only a city court.
Old Section 1712 was continued in substantially its
former state as Section 20-4-4, as follows:
''In cities where city c.ourts are established
no justice of the peace shall be elected or appointed, and the judge or judges of the city court
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the
precinct, and as suc.h shall perform the duties of
such office. As such ex-officio justices of the
peace they shall be the successors of the justices
of the peace acting in the city where such city
courts are est a hlished, ' '
The next change was in 1941, when Section 20-4-2
was amended by changing the figure 50,000 to 75,000.
(Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1941). By the 1943 revision
Section 20-4-2 was continued as amended in 1941, that
is, identical with the 1933 provision, supra, but with the
figure 50,000 now reading 75,000. Section 20-4-2 was
continued as in the 1933 revision, su.pra. No further
significant changes occured until 1951, when by Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, the amendments which gave
rise to this litig·ation were adopted.
To properly interpret the present status of city
courts and justices in cities where city courts are located,
the effect of the various statutory changes must be
analyzed. Certainly as late as the decisions in the cases
3li
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of Lealhanl, v. Reger, and Rich v. ludustrial Comrnissiou,
supra. \vhich interpreted Section 1701, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1917, as amended by Chapter 3-!, La\vs of 1919,
the city court "~as separate and distinct from the justices' court, albeit administered by a single individual
as judge.

But by

,~irtue

of the 1933 revision of the Laws
(Section 20-4-2), the statutory provisions theretofore
existing, and \Yhich resulted in the continuance of the
justices' court in cities where city courts existed through
their uuificatioJt 'vith city courts, were deleted, and
thence from there have been no justices' courts where
city courts exist. Section 20-4-4 of the 1933 Revision,
which \vas continued down to the enactment of the present law in 1951, took care of that in the following language:
·'In cities \vhere city courts are established
no justice of the peace shall be elected or appointed, and the judge or judges of the city court
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the
precinct, and as such shall perform the duties
of such office. As such ex-officio justices of
the peace they shall be the successors of the
justices of the peace acting in the city where such
city courts are established."
True it is that this section in substance existed
under old Section 1701, hut the then effect thereof was
in the light of a city court united with the justices' court.
Since 1933 a. city oourt is not a justices' court, nor any
part thereof, but exists purely and simply as an inferior
court created by the legislature and exercising jurisdiction prescribed by the legislature.
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Sinc.e the abolition from the statutes of the provisions of old Section 1701 uniting the courts, it might
he suggested that Section 20-4-4 is unconstitutional
in that it in effect abolishes the constitutional office
of justice of the peace in cities where city courts exist.
As this point is not here involved, nor the constitutionality of that . section directly challenged, we make
but the single observation that even if it has the effect
of abolishing justiees' courts in eities where city courts
exist it is not unconstitutional for that reason.
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
''The Legislature shall determin.e the number
of justices of the peace to be elected, and shall
fix their powers, duties and compensation.''
Here is an express grant of power to the legislature
to determine where justiees' courts shall and shall not
exist. In determining that justices' courts need not
exist where city courts have been created the legislature has acted within the constitution.
In State v. Beckman, (Mo.) 1945 185 8. W. 2d 810, it
was held:
''While the offic.e of justic.e of the peace
is a constitutional offiee, there is nothing in
Article VI, Seetion 37, limiting the power of the
legislature in determining how many justices
of the peace the public good requires.''
And in State v. Gibbons (Miwn. 1938) 278 N. W.

578:
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lT~1der

section 8 of article 6 of the Constitution. the Legislature has the po,ver to 'proYide for the election of a sufficient number of
justices of the peace in each county * * * 'vhose
duties and compensation shall be prescribed by
la"~.' l~nder this provision the Legislature has
the po\Y€1' to determine how many justices there
shall be in any county and what shall be their
duties. The Legislature may determine that there
shall be no justice of the peace in any given
cotmty or portion thereof and it may restrict the
constitutional jurisdiction of justices of the
peace.''
H

Our interpretation of the statutes, accordingly, leads
to the conclusion that at least since the 1933 Revision
the city courts haYe been wholly separate and distinct
entities created by the Legislature and existing by legislative grace under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. The legislature in creating them has likewise
fixed their jurisdiction. In so doing the legislature has
given them jurisdictional powers in many respects similar to that of justices of the peace, but in so doing the
judg·es thereof have not been made justices of the peace,
but rather independent judicial officers whose powers
and functions are solely as the legislature has determined.
This interpretation is not without benefit of judicial support. The same conclusion was reached by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Ex parte Boalt,
(Ore.) 260 P. 1004.
There the constitution of Oregon provided for the
election of justices of the peace for six year terms. The
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legislature, however, created a municipal court for the
city of Portland, and vested the judge thereof with the
''jurisdiction and authority of a justice of the
peace.''
and further provided for his election by the city counsel for a four year term. · In answering the contention
of the constitutional conflict the Supreme Court of
Oregon held :
''While it has been held that justices of the
peace should be elected for the term of six years,
there is nothing in the language of the constitution indicating that it was intended to apply to
muneipal judges clothed with the powers of a
justice of the peace.''
Thus it is apparent that the legislature has the power
to erea te a city eourt and the power to fix the manner
of how the judge thereof shall he selected - whether
by election, or appointment, or any other manner. Thus
it has the power to provide for the issuance of a certificate of election to an uneontested candidate for the
offiee.
We suhmi t, accordingly, that the office of judge
of the city eourt is not a constitutional office, but is
strictly a legislative office, and Section 104-4-3.10 is not
unconstitutional in providing for the manner of selection
of eity judges in the manner it does.
POINT IV
GENERAL OBSERVATION ON
rrHE PUBLIC INTEREST
Under this point of argument appellant seeks to
lull the court into a sense of security and well being
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by ob~er\·ing that thi~ court eun hold 104--!-3.10 uncon8titutional, and depriYe Respondent Patterson of his
office of City Judg·e, 'Yithout disturbing the situation
as to all of the other city judg·es 'vho hold certificates
of election as uncontested candidates under this same
Section 104--±-3.10. ..A. ppellant 's premise is that each
would thus hold over until his successor is elected and
qualified.

The difficulty "·ith the argument lies in the possible unsoundness of the premise that they hold over
beyond the term for ,vhich they were elected. The history of this law becomes curiouser and curiouser.
Old Section 1701, Revised Statutes or Utah, 1917,
as amended by Chapter 34, Laws of Utah, 1919·, in providing for the election of city judges, fixed their term
at four years,
''and until their successors are elected and qualified.''
When this section was amended by Section 20-4-2,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, this was deleted, and
their terms fixed simply at four years. Section 20-4-2,
U.C.A., 1943 was the same as in 1933, with no provisions
for holding over.
By Chapter 36, Laws of Utah, 1943, Section 20-4-2
was amended-the principal effect thereof being to
change the terms from four to six years-but the legislature there specifically provided
''Incumbents to hold office until successor
is elected and qualified a.t the municip·al election
in 1945. '' (Emphasis added)

35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thus the law stood at the time of the enactment of
Chapter 26, Laws of 1951, (now Section 104-4-3.10)
under which the judges of other city courts hold certificates of election a.s uncontested candidates, the same
as respondent Patterson.
Now the interesting thing is that not only does the
last law in effect prior to the, 1951 amendment not
provide for a general carry over, but specifically limits
carry over rights to incumbents in office at the time
of passage in 1943, and further limits their rights to
the time of the 1945 election.
We appreciate there is some conflict of authority
as to whether, absent specific statutory carry over
rights, an officer continues in office beyond his fixed
term and until his successor is qualified, and that this
court, by dictum at least, has approved the principle
that where the statute is silent the incumbent may hold
over beyond his term and until his successor is· elected
and qualified. As to whether during such carry over
period he is '' defacto '' or ''de jure'' is another debatable
question, which we won't dwell upon because our statute
here is not silent, but specifically fixes and limits carry
over rights to incumbents at the time the law was passed (Chapter 36, Laws of Utah, 1943), and then only
to the 1945 elections.
We submit, a-ccordingly, that everything is not in
the ·clear insofar as other city judges who hold certificates of election as uncontested candidates are concerned, and that this court cannot hold this law un-
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'

constitutional and thus deprive the respondent Patterson
of his office "~ithout jeopardizing the position of every
other city judge \Yho holds such a certificate of election.
It is, at least, highly questionable as to whether any
city judge who \Yas incumbent at the time of the 1951
election has any hold over rights as such whatever.
CONCLUSION
We submit, according·ly, that the judgment of the
lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD,

Attorneys for Respondent
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